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Abstract. Golle, Zhong, Boneh, Jakobsson, and Juels [10] recently pre-
sented a very efficient mix-net, that they claim to be both robust, and
secure. We present four practical attacks for their mix-net, and break
both its privacy and robustness. Each attack exploits and illustrates a
separate weakness of the protocol.
The first attack breaks the privacy of any given sender without corrupt-
ing any mix-server. The second attack requires that the first mix-server
is corrupted. Both attacks are adaptations of the “relation attack” in-
troduced by Pfitzmann [26, 25].
The third attack is similar to the attack of Desmedt and Kurusawa [4]
and breaks the privacy of all senders, and robustness. It requires that all
senders are honest, and that the last mix-server is corrupted.
The fourth attack is novel and breaks the privacy of any given sender.
It requires that the first and last mix-servers are corrupted. This attack
breaks also “Flash Mix” by Jakobsson [15], including the fixed version
given by Mitomo and Kurosawa [19].
1 Introduction
The notion of a mix-net was invented by Chaum [2], and further developed by
a number of people. Properly constructed a mix-net enables a set of senders to
send messages anonymously. A mix-net can be viewed as an electronic analog of
a tombola; messages are put into envelopes, the envelopes are mixed, and finally
opened. It is impossible to tell who sent any given message.
Informally the requirements on a mix-net are: correctness, privacy, robust-
ness, availability, and efficiency. Correctness implies that the result is correct
given that all mix-servers are honest. Privacy implies that if a fixed minimum
number of mix-servers are honest privacy of the sender of a message is ensured.
Robustness implies that if a fixed number of mix-servers are honest, then any
attempt to cheat is detected, and defeated. Availability and efficiency are the
general requirements on any system run on an open network.
A mix-net consists of a number of mix-servers, i.e. servers, that collectively
execute a protocol. The basic idea of a mix-net is that each mix-server receives a
list of encrypted messages, transforms them, using partial decryption or random
re-encryption, reorders them, and then outputs the transformed and reordered
list. It should be difficult to find an element in the input list, and an element
in the output list that encrypts the same message. The use of several mix-
servers allows a sender to trust a subset of the mix-servers to ensure privacy.
Later constructions have mostly dealt with robustness, availability and efficiency,
which are aspects ignored by Chaum.
1.1 Previous Work and Applications of Mix-Nets
The mixing paradigm has been used to accomplish privacy in many different
scenarios. Chaum’s original “anonymous channel” [2, 22] enables a sender to
securely send mail to a receiver anonymously, and also to securely receive mail
from this receiver without revealing the sender’s identity. When constructing
election schemes [2, 7, 24, 27, 21] the mix-net is used to ensure that the vote of
a given voter can not be revealed. Also in the construction of electronic cash
systems [14] mix-nets have been used to ensure privacy. Thus a mix-net is a
useful primitive in constructing cryptographic protocols.
Abe gives an efficient construction of a general mix-net [1], and argues about
its properties. Jakobsson has written (partly with Juels) a number of more gen-
eral papers on the topic of mixing [13, 15, 16] also focusing on efficiency, of which
the first appeared at the same time as Abe’s construction.
There has been a breakthrough in the construction of zero-knowledge proofs
of a correct shuffle recently. Furukawa and Sako [8], and Neff [20] respectively
have both found efficient ways to design such proofs.
A promising approach to practical mixing is given by Golle et al. [10]. They
combine a robustness test based partly on work by Jakobsson and Juels, with
the notion of “double enveloping”. The latter notion is introduced independently
by Wikstro¨m [32], except that he uses different keys for the two layers, and a
proof of knowledge of the inner most cleartext.
Desmedt and Kurosawa [4] describe an attack on a protocol by Jakobsson
[13]. Similarly Mitomo and Kurosawa [19] exhibit a weakness in another protocol
by Jakobsson [15]. Pfitzmann has given some general attacks on mix-nets [26,
25], and Michels and Horster give additional attacks in [18].
2 Review of “Optimistic Mixing for Exit-Polls”
We present a short review of the relevant parts of the protocol of Golle et al.
[10]. The description given here is as close as possible to the original, but we
avoid details irrelevant to our attacks, and change some notation to simplify the
exposition of the attacks. For details we refer the reader to [10].
2.1 Participants and Setup
The protocol assumes the existence of a bulletin board on which each participant
has a dedicated area on which only she can write. No participant can erase
anything on the bulletin board, but all participants can read read everything.
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The participants of the protocol are N senders, and a relatively small number
of mix-servers, M1, . . . ,Mk. Each sender encrypts its message, and writes it on
the bulletin board. The mix-servers then execute the mix-net protocol.
The protocol employs an El Gamal [6] cryptosystem in a subgroup GQ of
prime order Q of the multiplicative group modulo a prime P , i.e. Z∗P . A private
key x is generated by choosing x ∈ ZQ uniformly and independently at random.
The corresponding public key is (g, y), where g is a generator of GQ, and y =
gx. Encryption of a message m ∈ GQ using the public key (g, y) is given by
E(g,y)(m, r) = (gr, yrm), where r is chosen uniformly at random from ZQ, and
decryption of a cryptotext on the form (u, v) = (gr, yrm) using the private key
x is given by Dx(u, v) = u−xv = m. The El Gamal system also has the re-
encryptability1 property, i.e. given (u, v) and the public key (g, y), anybody can
“update” the randomness used in the encryption of m, by forming (gr
′
u, yr
′
v) =
(gr+r
′
, yr+r
′
m) = E(g,y)(m, r + r′).
In the setup stage each mix-server Mj is somehow given a random xj ∈ ZQ,
and yl = gxl for l 6= j. The value xj is also shared with the other mix-servers
using a threshold verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme2. Thus, if any mix-server
Mj is deemed to be cheating the other mix-servers can verifiable reconstruct its
private key xj . The mix-servers can also compute y =
∏k
j=1 yj , which gives a
joint public key (g, y), with secret corresponding private key x =
∑k
j=1 xj .
A practical advantage of the mix-net is that it can be used to execute several
mix-sessions using the same set of keys, i.e. the El Gamal keys are not changed
between mix-sessions. To be able to do this the proofs of knowledge below are
bound to a mix-session identifier id that is unique to the current mix-session.
2.2 Sending a Message to the Mix-Net
A typical honest sender, Alice, computes the following to send a message m to
the mix-net:
(u, v) = E(g,y)(m), w = h(u, v), and
α = [E(g,y)(u), E(g,y)(v), E(g,y)(w)] = [(µ1, µ2), (ν1, ν2), (ω1, ω2)] ,
where h : {0, 1}∗ → GQ is a hash function modeled by a random oracle. Then
Alice computes a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge piid(u, v, w), in the random
oracle model of u, v and w, that depends on the current mix-session identifier
id. Finally Alice writes (α, piid(u, v, w)) on the bulletin board.
2.3 Execution of the Mix-Net
First the mix-servers remove any duplicate inputs to the mix-net, and discard
input tuples that contain components not in the subgroup GQ. Then the mix-
servers discard all input tuples where the proof of knowledge is not valid for
1 Related terms are “homomorphic property”, or “malleability property”.
2 Golle et al. [10] discuss different variants for sharing keys, but we choose to present
a simple variant, since it has no impact on our attacks.
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the current mix-session. Let L0 = {[(a0,i, b0,i), (c0,i, d0,i), (e0,i, f0,i)]}Ni=1 be the
resulting list of triples of El Gamal pairs. The mixing then proceeds in the
following stages.
First Stage: Re-Randomization and Mixing. This step proceeds as in
all re-randomization mix-nets based on El Gamal. One by one, the mix-servers
M1, . . . ,Mk randomize all the inputs and their order. (Note that the components
of triples are not separated from each other during the re-randomization.) In
addition, each mix-net must give a proof that the product of the plaintexts of
all its inputs equals the product of the plaintexts of all its outputs. The protocol
proceeds as follows.
1. Each mix-server Mj reads from the bulletin board the list Lj−1 output by
the previous mix-server.
2. The mix-server then chooses rji, sji, tji ∈ ZQ, for i = 1, . . . , N , randomly
and computes the re-randomized list:
{[(grjiaj−1,i, yrjibj−1,i), (gsjicj−1,i, ysjidj−1,i), (gtjiej−1,i, ytjifj−1,i)]}Ni=1 .
The above list of triples is then randomly permuted, and the resulting list:
Lj = {[(aj,i, bj,i), (cj,i, dj,i), (ej,i, fj,i)]}Ni=1 is written on the bulletin board.
3. Define aj =
∏N
i=1 aj,i, and define bj , cj , dj , ej , and fj correspondingly.
The mix-server proves in zero-knowledge that logg aj/aj−1 = logy bj/bj−1,
logg cj/cj−1 = logy dj/dj−1, and logg ej/ej−1 = logy fj/fj−1. This implies
that Dx(aj , bj) = Dx(aj−1, bj−1), and similarly for the pairs (cj , dj) and
(ej , fj), i.e. the component-wise product of the inner triples remain un-
changed by the mix-server.
Remark 1. Since logy bj/bj−1 = logg aj/aj−1 =
∑N
i=1 rji, and Mj knows the
latter sum, the proof in step 3) can be implemented by a zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge in the random oracle model, and similarly for the pairs (cj , dj),
and (ej , fj). Such proofs are similar to Schnorr signatures [28], and presented in
several papers, e.g. Jakobsson [13].
Second Stage: Decryption of the Inputs.
1. A quorum of mix-servers jointly decrypt each triple of ciphertexts in Lk to
produce a list L on the form L = {(ui, vi, wi)}Ni=1. Since the method used to
do this is irrelevant to our attacks, we do not present it here.
2. All triples for which wi = h(ui, vi) are called valid.
3. Invalid triples are investigated according to the procedure described below.
If the investigation proves that all invalid triples are benign (only senders
cheated), we proceed to Step 4. Otherwise, the decryption is aborted, and
we continue with the back-up mixing.
4. A quorum of mix-servers jointly decrypt the ciphertexts (ui, vi) for all valid
triples. This successfully concludes the mixing. The final output is defined
as the set of plaintexts corresponding to valid triples.
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Special Step: Investigation of Invalid Triples. The mix-servers must re-
veal the path of each invalid triple through the various permutations. For each
invalid triple, starting from the last server, each server reveals which of its in-
puts corresponds to this triple, and how it re-randomized this triple. One of two
things may happen:
- Benign case (only senders cheated): if the mix-servers successfully pro-
duce all such paths, the invalid triples are known to have been submitted by
users. The decryption resumes after the invalid triples have been discarded.
- Serious case (one or more servers cheated): if one or more servers fail
to recreate the paths of invalid triples, these mix-servers are accused of cheat-
ing and replaced, and the mix-net terminates producing no output. In this
case, the inputs are handed over to the back-up mixing procedure below.
Back-Up Mixing. The outer-layer encryption of the inputs posted to the mix-
net is decrypted by a quorum of mix-servers. The resulting list of inner-layer
ciphertexts becomes the input to a standard re-encryption mix-net based on El
Gamal (using, for example Neff’s scheme described in [20]). Then the output of
the standard mix-net is given as output by the mix-net.
Remark 2. It is impossible to find two lists {(ui, vi)}Ni=1 6= {(u′i, v′i)}Ni=1 such that∏N
i=1 h(ui, vi) =
∏N
i=1 h(u
′
i, v
′
i), if the product is interpreted in a group where
the discrete logarithm problem is hard. This is stated as a theorem by Wagner3
[31], and appears as a lemma in Golle et al. [10].
Golle et al. [10] apply the lemma in a very clever way to provide robustness of
their protocol. During the re-encryption and mixing stage, each mix-server proves
in zero-knowledge that it leaves the component wise product (
∏
ui,
∏
vi,
∏
wi),
of the inner triples (ui, vi, wi) unchanged, but individual triples may still be cor-
rupted. Then invalid triples are traced back. This leaves only valid inner triples
in the output and the proofs of knowledge of each server is used to conclude
that the component wise product of these valid inner triples was left unchanged
by the mix-net. The lemma is then applied to conclude that the set of valid
triples in the output is identical to the set of valid triples hidden in the double
encrypted input to the mix-net.
Unfortunately, our third attack in Section 3.3, shows that it is possible to
cheat without changing the set of inner triples.
3 The Attacks
The goal of the adversary, who we in this paper call Eve, is to break the privacy
of our typical honest sender Alice, and cheat without detection. Each of our
attacks illustrates a separate weakness of the protocol.
The first two attacks are adaptations of the “relation attack”, introduced
by Pfitzmann [26, 25], to the setting with double enveloping. The idea of the
3 Wagner credits Wei Dai with this observation.
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“relation attack” is that to break the privacy of Alice, Eve computes a cryptotext
of a message related to Alice’s message. Then the mix-net is run as usual. The
output of the mix-net contains two messages related in a way chosen by Eve.
Some relations let Eve determine the message sent by Alice. The third attack is
similar to the attack of Desmedt and Kurosawa [4] in that it exploits intermediate
results of the protocol and fools a “product test”. The fourth attack is novel.
3.1 First Attack: Honest Mix-Servers
We show that the adversary Eve can break the privacy of the typical sender Alice.
All that is required is that Eve can send two messages to the mix-net, which is
a natural assumption in most scenarios. In the following we use the notation for
the cryptotext of Alice introduced in Section 2.2. Eve does the following:
1. Eve chooses δ and γ randomly in ZQ, and computes:
wδ = h(µδ1, µ
δ
2), αδ = (E(g,y)(µ
δ
1), E(g,y)(µ
δ
2), E(g,y)(wδ)) , and
wγ = h(µ
γ
1 , µ
γ
2), αγ = (E(g,y)(µ
γ
1), E(g,y)(µ
γ
2), E(g,y)(wγ)) .
Then Eve computes corresponding proofs of knowledge piid(µ
δ
1, µ
δ
2, wδ) and
piid(µ
γ
1 , µ
γ
2 , wγ). This gives Eve two perfectly valid pairs (αδ, piid(µ
δ
1, µ
δ
2, wδ)),
(αγ , piid(µ
γ
1 , µ
γ
2 , wγ)), that she sends to the bulletin board (possibly by cor-
rupting two senders).
2. Eve waits until the mix-net has successfully completed its execution. Dur-
ing the execution of the mix-net, the mix-servers first jointly decrypt the
“outer layer” of the double encrypted messages. After benign tuples have
been removed, the result is a list of valid triples
((u1, v1, w1), . . . , (uN , vN , wN )) . (1)
The final output of the mix-net is the result of decrypting each inner El
Gamal pair (ui, vi) and results in a list of cleartext messages (m1, . . . ,mN ).
3. Eve computes the list (m′1, . . . ,m
′
N ) = (m
δ/γ
1 , . . . ,m
δ/γ
N ), and then finds
a pair (i, j) such that mi = m′j . From this she concludes that with very
high probability mj = uγ . Then she computes z = m
1/γ
j , and finds a triple
(ul, vl, wl) in the list (1) such that z = ul. Finally she concludes that with
very high probability ml was the message sent by Alice to the mix-net.
Remark 3. At additional computational cost it suffices for Eve to send 2 mes-
sages to break the privacy of K senders. Suppose Eve wants to break the pri-
vacy also of Bob who sent m′ encrypted as (u′, v′) = E(g,y)(m′), w′ = h(u′, v′),
and α′ = [E(g,y)(u′), E(g,y)(v′), E(g,y)(w′)] = [(µ′1, µ
′
2), (ν
′
1, ν
′
2), (ω
′
1, ω
′
2)]. Then
Eve performs the attack above with the change that she starts with a single
pair (µζ1µ
′
1, µ
ζ
2µ
′
2) for some randomly chosen ζ instead of the two distinct pairs
(µ1, µ2), and (µ′1, µ
′
2) that would have given two “unrelated” attacks. The origi-
nal third step of the attack first gives Eve z = uζu′. To finish the attack she finds
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a pair (l, l′) such that uζl ul′ = z, and concludes that with high probability Alice
sent ml, and Bob sent ml′ . The approach is generalized to higher dimensions
in the natural way, to break the privacy of several senders (K must clearly be
reasonably sized).
Why the Attack is Possible. The attack exploits two different flaws of the
protocol. The first is that the sender of a message, e.g. Alice, proves only knowl-
edge of the inner El Gamal pair (u, v) and the hash value w = h(u, v), and not
knowledge of the message m. The second flaw is that identical El Gamal keys
are used for both the inner and outer El Gamal system.
Anybody can compute a single encrypted message (µδ1, µ
δ
2) = (g
rδ, yrδuδ) =
E(g,y)(uδ, rδ) of a power uδ of the first component u of the inner El Gamal
pair (u, v) of the triple α sent by Alice. Anybody can also compute a proof of
knowledge of (µδ1, µ
δ
2) and wδ = h(µ
δ
1, µ
δ
2) (and similarly for (µ
γ
1 , µ
γ
2) and ωγ).
The first flaw allows Eve to input triples of El Gamal pairs with such proofs
of knowledge as input to the mix-net. The second flaw allows Eve to use the
mix-net to decrypt (µδ1, µ
δ
2), and thus get her hands on u
δ (and similarly for uγ).
Eve can then identify (u, v) as the inner El Gamal pair of Alice, and break her
privacy.
3.2 Second Attack: Different Keys and Corrupt Mix-Server
Suppose we change the protocol slightly by requiring that the mix-servers gen-
erate separate keys for the outer and inner El Gamal systems, to avoid the first
attack of Section 3.1. That is, we assume that there are two different key pairs
((g, yin), xin) and ((g, yout), xout), for the inner and outer El Gamal layers respec-
tively, and also assume that these keys has been shared similarly as the original
key pair ((g, y), x). This is the type of double enveloping proposed by Wikstro¨m
[32]. For the second attack to succeed we need some additional assumptions.
Unclear Details and Additional Assumptions. We start by quoting Section
5, under “Setup.” point 4 of Golle et al. [10], that presents the proof of knowledge
piid(u, v, w) of the sender Alice:
4. This proof of knowledge should be bound to a unique mix-session
identifier to achieve security over multiple invocations of the mix. Any
user who fails to give the proof is disqualified, and the corresponding
input is discarded.
If different keys are used for each mix-session then the above makes no sense,
since the proof of knowledge of u, v and w already depends on the public key
of the outer El Gamal system. There is clearly practical value in not changing
keys between mix-sessions.
We assume that the keys are not changed between mix-sessions, even if a
mix-server is found to be cheating. If a mix-server is found to be cheating its
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shared keys are instead reconstructed by the remaining mix-servers using the
VSS-scheme, and in later mix-sessions the actions of the cheating mix-server are
performed either in the open (the details of this does not matter to our attack).
Under these assumptions we can give an attack on the protocol.
The original paper of Golle et al. [10] does not explicitly say if the discovery
of the corrupted mix-server results in a new execution of the key generation
protocol. Apparently the intention of the authors is to let the remaining mix-
servers generate a new set of keys if any cheating is discovered [11].
The attack is interesting even though this interpretation is not the one in-
tended by the authors, since it shows the importance of explicitly defining all
details of protocols, and highlights some issues with running several concurrent
mix-sessions using the same set of keys.
The Attack. Apart from the above assumptions, the attack only requires that
the first mix-server in the mix-chain is corrupted. The attack is employed during
two mix-sessions using the same keys, and the corrupted mix-server is identified
as a cheater in the first mix-session. In the following we describe the actions of
Eve during the first, and second mix-sessions, respectively.
The First Mix-Session. We assume that Alice, and some other arbitrary
sender Bob, have sent inputs to the mix-net (and use the notation of Remark
3 for the input of Bob). Eve corrupts M1. It then replaces α and α′ with:
[Eyout(u), Eyout(v), Eyout(w
′)], and [Eyout(u
′), Eyout(v
′), Eyout(w)] respectively, in
its input list, i.e. the third components of the two triples are shifted. Then Eve
forces M1 to simulate a completely honest mix-server on the resulting altered
list L′0 = {[(a′0,i, b′0,i), (c′0,i, d′0,i), (e′0,i, f ′0,i)]}Ni=1. Note that
∏N
i=1 a
′
0,i = a0, and
similarly for b0, c0, d0, e0, and f0. Thus, the simulated honest mix-server outputs
perfectly valid zero-knowledge proofs that the product of the inner triples are
unchanged.
At the end of the mixing the mix-servers verify the tuples, and discover the
invalid tuples (u, v, w′) and (u′, v′, w). These tuples are traced back all the way
to the first mix-server, which is revealed as a cheater. In this process Eve is able
to link Alice to (u, v) (and Bob to (u′, v′)). Finally the honest mix-servers finish
the protocol by using the general constructions based on the work by Neff [20]
as in Golle et al. [10].
The Second Mix-Session. To allow the mix-net to execute a second mix-
session using the same set of keys, the cheater’s key is reconstructed, and revealed
by a quorum of the mix-servers.
To determine the contents of the El Gamal pair (u, v), Eve waits for the
second mix-session using the same set of keys. Then she uses a “relation attack”
[26, 25, 13] in the second mix-session to decrypt (u, v), i.e. Eve does the following:
1. Eve chooses δ and γ randomly in ZQ, and computes:
wδ = h(uδ, vδ), αδ = (Eyout(u
δ), Eyout(v
δ), Eyout(wδ)), and
wγ = h(uγ , vγ), αγ = (Eyout(u
γ), Eyout(v
γ), Eyout(wγ)).
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Then Eve computes corresponding proofs of knowledge piid(u
δ, vδ, wδ) and
piid(u
γ , vγ , wγ). This gives Eve two perfectly valid pairs (αδ, piid(u
δ, vδ, wδ)),
(αγ , piid(u
γ , vγ , wγ)), that she sends to the bulletin board (possibly by cor-
rupting two senders).
2. Eve waits until the mix-net has successfully completed its execution. The
final output of the mix-net is a list of cleartext messages (m1, . . . ,mN ).
3. Note that mi = mδ and mj = mγ for some i and j. Eve computes δγ−1 mod
Q, computes the list (m′1, . . . ,m
′
N ) = (m
δ/γ
1 , . . . ,m
δ/γ
N ), and finally finds a
pair (i, j) such that mi = m′j . Then she concludes that with high probability
m
1/γ
j is the message sent by Alice to the mix-net in the first mix-session.
Remark 4. The attack is easily generalized to break the privacy of several senders
by using a circular shift of the third components during the first mix-session.
It is also easy to see that Remark 3 can be applied to reduce the number of
messages sent by Eve during the second mix-session.
Why the Attack is Possible. The attack exploits that the sender of a mes-
sage only proves knowledge of the inner triple (u, v, w). At the cost of detected
cheating Eve finds a (u, v) corresponding to Alice, and then uses the second
mix-session as a decryption oracle, and get her hands on m.
A Note on Concurrent Mix-Sessions. Ignoring the other attacks, a simple
countermeasure to the second attack above, is to stipulate that if a cheating
mix-server is identified, new keys must be generated for the next mix-session.
A disadvantage of this countermeasure is that the mix-net can not be allowed
to execute several concurrent mix-sessions using the same keys. If one mix-session
is still receiving messages while another mix-session discovers a cheating mix-
server, the second attack of Section 3.2 can still be applied. The problem is not
solved by running the back-up mix-net of Neff [20] on all mix-sessions using the
same keys at this point.
This problem of concurrency may seem academic, since in most election sce-
narios it is not very cumbersome to have different keys for each mix-session,
but in future applications of mix-nets it may be useful to run several concurrent
mix-sessions using the same keys.
3.3 Third Attack: Honest Senders and Two Corrupt Mix-Servers
In this section we assume that all senders, and all mix-servers, except the last
mix-serverMk, are honest. The last mix-serverMk is corrupted by the adversary
Eve, and performs the attack. The attack breaks both robustness and privacy.
To simplify notation we write L0 = {αi}Ni=1 for the input list, where we define
αi = [(a0,i, b0,i), (c0,i, d0,i), (e0,i, f0,i)] to be the tuple sent by sender Si. Instead
of following the protocol, Mk proceeds as follows in the first stage.
1. It computes the 6-tuple: (a′, b′, . . . , f ′) = (ak−1/a0, bk−1/b0, . . . , fk−1/f0),
and the tuple α′1 = [(a
′a0,1, b′b0,1), (c′c0,1, d′d0,1), (e′e0,1, f ′f0,1)].
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2. Then it forms the list L′k−1 = {α′1, α2, . . . , αN}, i.e. a copy of L0 with the
first tuple α1 replaced by α′1.
3. When Mk is supposed to re-randomize and permute the output Lk−1 of
Mk−1, it instead simulates the actions of an honest mix-server on the cor-
rupted input L′k−1. The output list written to the bulletin board by the
simulated mix-server is denoted Lk.
4. Eve then waits until the inner layer has been decrypted, and uses her knowl-
edge of the permutation that relates Lk to L0, to break privacy of all senders.
We show that the attack goes undetected, i.e. the mix-servers decrypt the inner
layer. This implies that the attack succeeds.
Firstly, consider the proof of knowledge that Mk produces during the re-
encryption and mixing stage. Define a′k−1 = (a
′a0,1)
∏N
i=2 a0,i, and similarly
for for b′k−1, c
′
k−1, d
′
k−1, e
′
k−1, and f
′
k−1. In step 3 above the simulated hon-
est mix-server outputs proofs of knowledge of the logarithms: logg ak/a′k−1 =
logy bk/b′k−1, logg ck/c
′
k−1 = logy dk/d
′
k−1, and logg ek/e
′
k−1 = logy fk/f
′
k−1. By
construction we have that a′k−1 = (a
′a0,1)
∏N
i=2 a0,i = a
′∏N
i=1 a0,i =
ak−1
a0
a0 =
ak−1, and similarly for bk−1, ck−1, dk−1, ek−1, and fk−1. This implies that the
proof of knowledge produced by Mk is deemed valid by the other mix-servers.
Secondly, consider the investigation of invalid inner triples. Tracing back
invalid triples is difficult to Mk, since it does not know the re-encryption ex-
ponents and the permutation relating Lk−1 and Lk. We show that there are
no invalid inner triples. Suppose we define the sums r =
∑k−1
j=1
∑N
i=1 rji, s =∑k−1
j=1
∑N
i=1 sji, and t =
∑k−1
j=1
∑N
i=1 tji, i.e. we form the sum of all re-encryption
exponents used by all mix-servers except the last, for the first second and third
El Gamal pairs respectively. Since all mix-servers except Mk are honest, we
have (a′, b′, c′, d′, e′, f ′) = (gr, yr, gs, ys, gt, yt), which implies that α′1 is a valid
re-encryption of α1. Thus Mk does not corrupt any inner triple by simulating
an honest mix-server on the input L′k−1. Since all senders are honest and the set
of inner triples hidden in L0 and L′k−1 are identical, there are no invalid inner
triples. Thus cheating is not detected, and robustness is broken.
We conclude that the mix-servers decrypt the inner triples, i.e. the privacy
of all senders is broken.
Why the Attack is Possible. The third attack above exploits that the last
mix-server Mk is not forced to take the output Lk−1 of the next to last mix-
server as input. This allows Mk to use a slightly modified version of L0 instead,
which breaks the privacy of all senders.
3.4 Fourth Attack: Two Corrupt Mix-Servers
In this section we assume that the first and last mix-servers, M1 and Mk are
corrupted. We give a novel attack that breaks the privacy of any given sender
Alice. Let L0 = {αi}Ni=1, where αi = [(a0,i, b0,i), (c0,i, d0,i), (e0,i, f0,i)]. Without
loss we let α1 and α2 be the tuples sent by Alice and Bob respectively. Let
ξ ∈ Z∗P \GQ. Eve corrupts M1 and Mk, and they proceed as follows.
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1. M1 computes the elements α′1 = [(ξa0,1, b0,1), (c0,1, d0,1), (e0,1, f0,1)] and
α′2 = [(ξ
−1a0,2, b0,2), (c0,2, d0,2), (e0,2, f0,2)], and forms the modified list L′0 =
{α′1, α′2, α3, . . . , αN}. Then M1 simulates an honest mix-server on input L′0.
2. Mk simulates an honest mix-server on input Lk−1, but it does not write the
output Lk of this simulation on the bulletin board. Let Lk = {βi}Ni=1, where
βi = [(ak,i, bk,i), (ck,i, dk,i), (ek,i, fk,i)]. Mk finds l, l′ ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that
aQk,l = ξ
Q and aQk,l′ = ξ
−Q.
Then it computes the tuples β′l = [(ξ
−1ak,l, bk,l), (ck,l, dk,l), (ek,l, fk,l)] and
β′l′ = [(ξak,l′ , bk,l′), (ck,l′ , dk,l′), (ek,l′ , fk,l′)], and writes L
′
k, where L
′
k defined
by L′k = {β1, . . . , βl−1, β′l, βl+1, . . . , βl′−1, β′l′ , βl′+1, . . . , βN}, on the bulletin
board.
3. The mix-net outputs (m1, . . . ,mN ), and Eve concludes that Alice sent ml.
Since all mix-servers exceptM1 andMk are honest, there exists l, l′ ∈ {1, . . . , N}
and r, r′ ∈ ZQ such that ak,l = grξa0,1 and ak,l′ = gr′ξ−1a0,2. This implies that
aQk,l = ξ
Q(gra0,1)Q = ξQ and a
−Q
k,l′ = ξ
−Q, since βQ = 1 for any β ∈ GQ. We
have ξQ 6= 1 6= ξ−Q, since the order of ξ does not divide Q. On the other hand
we have aQk,i = 1 for i 6= l, l′, since ak,i ∈ GQ for i 6= l, l′. Thus Eve successfully
identifies Alice’s cryptotext, if the cheating of M1 and Mk is not detected.
Clearly, b1, c1, d1, e1, and f1 are not changed by replacing L0 with L′0 in step
1. Neither is a1, since (ξa0,1)(ξ−1a0,2)
∏N
i=3 a0,i =
∏N
i=1 a0,i = a1. Similarly, bk,
ck, dk, ek, and fk are not changed by replacing Lk with L′k in step 2. Neither
is ak, since (ξ−1ak,l)(ξak,l′)
∏N
i 6=l,l′ ak,i =
∏N
i=1 ak,i. Similarly as in the second
attack of Section 3.3, we conclude that the proofs of knowledge produced by M1
and Mk are deemed valid by the other mix-servers. If we assume that Alice and
Bob are honest, their inner triples are never traced back, and cheating is not
detected.
If ξ = ξ−1, Eve can only conclude that Alice sent a message from the set
{ml,ml′}. This already breaks the privacy of Alice, but “Bob” may also be
chosen to be some corrupted sender, and Alice’s message identified uniquely.
Why the Attack is Possible. The third attack above exploits the fact that a
mix-serverMj never verifies that all elements in its input Lj−1 reside in GQ. This
is used by M1 to “tag” elements in the input list, which let them be identified
by the last mix-server Mk.
Note that it is very common in protocols to implicitly assume that elements
are in GQ. We believe that several other protocols are vulnerable to the malicious
use of elements in Z∗P \GQ.
4 Further Applications and Future Work
The attacks given in this paper work also if Z∗P ⊃ GQ are replaced by similarly
related elliptic curves.
The attacks of sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 all exploit the particular structure of
the protocol of Golle et al. [10]. We have found no other protocol vulnerable to
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these attacks. In particular the protocol by Jakobsson [15] with similar structure,
is not vulnerable to the attack of Section 3.2.
The novel attack of Section 3.4 can be applied to break privacy of “Flash Mix”
by Jakobsson [15], and the fixed protocol proposed4 by Mitomo and Kurosawa
[19]. We sketch how this is done in Appendix A. We are currently investigating
what other mix-nets are vulnerable to variants of the novel attack.
As explained within this paper, our attacks exploit four different flaws of
the protocol: the lack of an appropriate proof of knowledge, the use of identical
keys for the inner and outer system, the possibility for the last mix-server to use
corrupt input in the re-randomization and mixing stage without detection, and
the lack of verification that elements in the input to a mix-server reside in GQ.
It is not hard to come up with countermeasures for our particular attacks.
However, it is not clear that countering our particular attacks suffices to make
the protocol secure.
An interesting open question is what other protocols are vulnerable to attacks
based on malicious use of elements in Z∗P \GQ.
5 Conclusion
We have presented several practical attacks for the mix-net recently proposed
by Golle, Zhong, Boneh, Jakobsson, and Juels [10], claimed secure by the au-
thors. In particular we have shown that the privacy of any given sender can be
broken without corrupting any mix-server, and that the privacy of all senders
can be broken if the last mix-server is corrupted. Each of our attacks illustrates
a separate weakness of the protocol.
Furthermore, one of the attacks is novel and breaks privacy also of the mix-net
by Jakobsson [15], including the fixed protocol given by Mitomo and Kurosawa
[19].
The relatively large number of attacks for mix-nets, presented here and in
other papers [25, 25, 18, 4, 19], suggest that we should be careful with unproven
claims of security for mix-nets. Subtle mistakes on details can make a mix-net
completely insecure.
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A Attack for “Flash Mix”
In this section we assume that the reader is familiar with the protocol by Jakob-
sson [15], and sketch how this protocol can be broken by a natural adaptation
of the novel attack of Section 3.3.
Computations in this protocol are performed in a similar group as in Golle
et al. [10]. Thus let ξ ∈ Z∗P \GQ.
The attack is employed during the “second re-encryption”. The adversary
corrupts the first and the last mix-servers,M1 andMk, in the mix-chain. During
the “second re-encryption”, M1 “tags” two arbitrary El Gamal pairs in its input
by multiplying their first components with ξ and ξ−1 respectively (similarly as
in Section 3.3). Then the honest mix-servers perform their re-encryption and
mixing. When the last mix-server Mk is about to re-encrypt and mix the output
of the previous mix-server Mk−1, it identifies the “tagged” El Gamal pairs,
removes the “tags” by multiplying the first components by ξ−1 and ξ respectively,
and then finally re-encrypts and mix the resulting list honestly.
After the verification of the “first re-encryption”, this breaks the privacy of
some randomly chosen sender, if the cheating goes undetected. Although the
attack is weak, it does break privacy.
Cheating is detected if one of two things happen; the adversary by chance
chooses a “dummy element” that is later traced back through the mix-chain, or if
M1 orMk fails to play its part in the computation of the “relative permutations”
correctly. The first event is very unlikely since by construction there are very few
“dummy elements”. Since the “tags” are removed by Mk, and both M1 and Mk
follow the protocol honestly except for the use of the tags, they can easily play
their part of the computation of the “relative permutations” correctly. Thus the
cheating is not detected and the privacy of the protocol is broken.
It is easy to see that the changes introduced by Mitomo and Kurosawa [19]
do not counter the above attack.
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